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Executive summary
OLAF: DETECT, INVESTIGATE, PROTECT
In 2018, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
concluded complex, large-scale investigations, stopping 
fraudsters in Europe and beyond from pocketing EU 
money.
OLAF investigations ranged from cross-border 
cases involving collusion between beneficiaries and 
contractors to major undervaluation fraud cases 
where fraudsters made a profit from declaring falsely 
low values for goods at import in the EU, or cases of 
corruption in high-value EU tenders. 
OLAF’S INVESTIGATIVE PERFORMANCE IN 2018:
  OLAF concluded 167 investigations, issuing 256 
recommendations to the relevant national and EU 
authorities. 
  OLAF recommended the recovery of EUR 371 million 
to the EU budget. 
  OLAF opened 219 new investigations, following 1 259 
preliminary analyses carried out by OLAF experts.
TRENDS IN ANTI-FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:
The transnational dimension of its work allows OLAF 
to form a unique view of the picture of the changing 
nature of fraud across Europe. OLAF therefore once 
again presented an analysis of some of the most striking 
trends revealed by OLAF investigations:
  Cross-border fraud schemes where shell companies 
are used to disguise fake business transactions
  Fraud in the promotion of European agricultural 
products
  Organised crime involvement in defrauding EU 
funds meant to fund refugee camps
  The evasion of customs duties by highly-organised 
criminal groups 
OLAF’S FIGHT AGAINST SMUGGLING:
In addition to its investigation and coordination cases, 
in 2018 OLAF co-organised or provided support to five 
Joint Customs Operations and has made significant 
progress in its efforts to fight the illicit trade in tobacco 
products by helping national authorities seize 350 
million cigarette sticks.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE EU POLICIES TO FIGHT 
FRAUD:
OLAF is regularly at the forefront of negotiating 
legislative texts concerning the protection of the EU’s 
financial interests against fraud and corruption. In 
2018, OLAF was instrumental in the development of 
the new Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS). The 
strategy aims to reinforce OLAF’s analytical capacity, 
further strengthen the cooperation between OLAF and 
Commission services and enhance the Commission’s 
corporate oversight in anti-fraud matters. OLAF also 
worked towards supporting the entry into force of 
a new global anti-smuggling treaty, the Protocol to 
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, as well as 
on a new Commission Action Plan to fight the illicit 
tobacco trade. 
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Foreword
It is with great pleasure that, for the first time as appointed Director-General of the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), I present OLAF’s annual report for 2018. While the 
second half of 2018 corresponds to my time in office, many of OLAF’s successes featured 
in this report were achieved under the leadership of Nicholas Ilett, the former Acting 
Director-General, whose dedication to OLAF was unparalleled. I would like to extend to 
him my utmost gratitude for the way he managed and contributed to the evolution of 
the Office. 
Although in a transitional period, I am proud to confirm that OLAF maintained a strong 
investigative performance in 2018. The Office focused its efforts on the areas where 
it could bring the most added value to European citizens. Indeed, the cross-border 
dimension and level of complexity of cases investigated by OLAF makes them impossible 
to be tackled by national authorities alone. Whether in the area of Structural Funds, 
Customs or Research Funds, OLAF’s unique expertise and its team of highly-qualified 
investigators, digital forensic experts and analysts have helped the Office solve even 
the most difficult cases and stop organised criminals from defrauding the EU budget. In 
2018, OLAF issued 256 recommendations aimed at recovering EUR 371 million. 
By turning its investigative experience into anti-fraud policy, notably into fraud 
prevention and legislative work, OLAF supports the EU institutions in constantly 
improving the protection of EU financial interests. In 2018, OLAF worked with 
Commission Directorates-General on the revision of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud 
Strategy, and is now steering its implementation. The strategy aims to enhance data 
analysis to support evidence-based anti-fraud policy measures and promotes more 
efficient anti-fraud controls based on the comprehensive examination of fraud risks. In 
practice, I envisage this leading to OLAF further developing its analytical capacities and 
becoming a European Knowledge Centre in fraud prevention and analysis, working at 
the disposal of the European institutions, as well as that of national authorities. 
The past year has also brought us closer to the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The creation of the EPPO marks a fundamental development 
in the fight against fraud affecting the EU budget, addressing shortcomings in the 
current enforcement system and constituting a crucial step towards the creation of a 
common criminal justice area in the European Union. 
I am personally invested in ensuring a positive cooperation with the EPPO from day 
one. However, to become an even stronger partner for the EPPO, OLAF needs the right 
tools to act in a coherent manner across Member States. This is why, in revising OLAF’s 
legal basis, the Commission has proposed to equip the Office with the means it needs 
not only to be a reliable and efficient partner to the new European Prosecutor, but also 
to continue to efficiently protect the EU citizens and their money in an evolving context. 
The nature of fraud has been changing significantly over recent years and continues to 
shift in line with a more digital world, in which e-commerce develops exponentially and 
activities of criminal groups transcend national borders. In this new landscape, OLAF 
will work tirelessly to meet the expectations of EU citizens for a European Union which 
better protects not only their money, but also their health, safety and environment.
This year we mark the 20th anniversary of OLAF in tackling fraud involving EU funds. 
With an extremely capable and knowledgeable staff, a great reputation among national 
administrations and law enforcement bodies, OLAF is ready to grow and develop, in 
order to deliver on its important mandate. It is vital for us that EU citizens know that 
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1. Mission and mandate 
MISSION
Detect, investigate and work towards stopping fraud 
involving European Union funds.
MANDATE
OLAF’s mandate is:
  to conduct independent administrative 
investigations into fraud and corruption involving EU 
funds so as to protect EU taxpayers’ money;
  to investigate serious misconduct by EU staff and 
members of the EU institutions, thus contributing to 
strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU institutions;
  to develop EU policies to counter fraud.
OLAF investigates matters relating to fraud, corruption 
and other illegal activities affecting both EU expenditure 
and EU revenue. 
OLAF is part of the European Commission and, as such, 
under the responsibility of Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger. 
However, in its investigative mandate, OLAF acts in full 
independence. 
In August 2018, following a selection procedure, Mr Ville 
Itälä took up the position of OLAF Director-General.
With a background in law and experience working as 
a police commissioner, Mr Itälä kicked off his political 
career as a Member of the Finish Parliament, where he 
focused on fundamental rights. In 2000, he became 
Minister of the Interior, and in 2001, he was appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister of Finland.
In 2004, Mr Itälä was elected Member of the European 
Parliament, a position he held for eight years. During 
this time, he served, among others, on the Committee 
on Transport and Tourism and was the Deputy-Chair of 
the Committee on Budgetary Control. 
Before being appointed as Head of OLAF, Mr Itälä 
worked as a Member of the European Court of Auditors.
WHAT WE DO 
OLAF’s investigative work broadly involves:
  assessing  incoming information of potential 
investigative interest to determine whether 
there are sufficient grounds for OLAF to open an 
investigation;
  conducting administrative anti-fraud investigations, 
where appropriate in cooperation with national 
criminal or administrative investigative authorities 
and with EU and international bodies;
  supporting the anti-fraud investigations of national 
authorities;
10
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  recommending actions that should be taken by the 
relevant EU or national authorities;
  monitoring the actions taken by these authorities, 
in order to assess the impact of OLAF’s work in the 
fight against fraud and to better tailor the support 
OLAF provides to national authorities.
Responsibilities for much of EU spending are shared 
between authorities at European, national, regional 
and local levels. Even where EU institutions manage 
funds directly, the money is often spent across national 
borders and sometimes outside the EU. The detection, 
investigation and prosecution of fraud against the EU 
budget can therefore only be conducted in cooperation 
with a wide range of partners, at national, European and 
international level. 
OLAF cases frequently concern: 
  cross-border procurement fraud or corruption 
in public procurement procedures involving EU 
financing;
  double funding, where, through deceit, a project is 
funded several times by different donors who are 
unaware of the contributions the others made;
  subsidy fraud in different forms, as fraudsters 
take advantage of the difficulties of managing and 
controlling transnational expenditure programmes. 
Examples include the delivery of the same piece 
of research to several funding authorities within 
or beyond EU borders, plagiarism – the copying of 
research, which has already been undertaken by 
others, or the deliberate gross disrespect of the 
conditions of financial assistance;
  customs fraud where fraudsters attempt to avoid 
paying customs duties (EU own resources), for 
instance by smuggling goods into the EU.
EU bodies are, like other employers, at risk of fraud from 
their members and staff in relation to remuneration, 
travel and relocation allowances, social security 
and health entitlements. They may also be at risk of 
corrupt activity by members and staff in procurement 
procedures, and of other forms of corruption such as 
attempts to illicitly influence decision-making and 
recruitment procedures. To some degree, these risks are 
enhanced by the transnational nature of EU business. 
OLAF has therefore a unique mandate to carry out 
so-called “internal” investigations into any allegations 
of misconduct involving staff and members of the EU 
institutions.
OLAF investigators and Member State partners during carousel fraud operation
11
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2. OLAF investigative activity:  
trends in anti-fraud investigations


















2.1. Summary of OLAF’s  
investigative performance  
in 2018
In 2018, OLAF opened 219 investigations after a process 
of analysing incoming information in 1 259 selections. It 
concluded 167 investigations, which led to OLAF issuing 
256 recommendations to competent authorities at EU 
and national level. As a result of the investigations 
concluded during 2018, OLAF recommended the 
recovery of EUR 371 million to the EU budget. This 
money will progressively be recovered by the relevant 
authorities at EU and Member State level, so it can go to 
projects that can improve the lives of all Europeans. For 
a detailed presentation of these and other performance 
indicators, please refer to the Annex to this Report. 
In Figure 4, you can find a breakdown of the 
investigations concluded by OLAF in 2018, concerning 
the use of EU funds managed or spent in whole or in 
part at national or regional level. This overview presents 
the geographical focus of OLAF’s investigative activity 
in 2018. Figure 5 shows that, as was the case in previous 
years, the “structural funds” sector remains at the core 
of OLAF’s investigative activity. 
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Figure 4:  Investigations into the use of EU funds managed or spent in whole or in part at national or 
regional level concluded in 2018
Country Cases concluded



















Belarus, Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Germany, 
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Ivory coast, Lithuania, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Portugal, Russian 






Figure 5: Ongoing investigations at the end of 2018, by sector
Reporting sector 2015 2016 2017 2018
Structural Funds 104 69 73 85
Centralised Expenditure 58 59 71 82
EU Staff 37 48 64 65
New Financial Instruments 8 8 18 48
External Aid 66 52 58 44
Customs and Trade 50 60 44 43
Agricultural Funds 36 21 22 33
Social Fund 21 19 5 11
Tobacco and Counterfeit goods 18 8 7 3
Total 398 344 362 414
14
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2.2. Follow the money:  
OLAF solves complex cases, 
traces EU money pocketed  
by fraudsters
For the past 20 years, OLAF has been at the forefront 
of fighting fraud involving European Union funds. It 
has solved thousands of complex, transnational cases 
and recommended several billion euros to be returned 
to the EU budget. Years of experience and a team of 
highly-qualified investigators, forensic experts and 
analysts put the Office in a unique position to identify 
red flags, spot fraud patterns and efficiently investigate 
even the most intricate cases. Furthermore, as OLAF’s 
primary goal is to ensure no EU funds are lost to fraud, 
OLAF experts go to great lengths to trace defrauded 
funds, often hidden in third countries. 
In this chapter, you can find an analysis of some of the 
most striking trends revealed by OLAF investigations 
in 2018. This analysis is based on empirical evidence, 
without amounting to a complete list of investigations 
concluded by OLAF. However, these trends give an 
indication of the ways in which fraudsters try to pocket 
EU money and of the areas most prone to fraudulent 
activities.
SHELL COMPANIES AND  
FAKE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
Setting up fake companies in order to obtain EU funds 
seems to be a favourite method for fraudsters, who go to 
great lengths to disguise falsified business transactions. 
In recent years, OLAF has investigated an increasing 
number of cross-border cases involving allegations 
of fraud with European Regional Development Funds 
(ERDF), including collusion between beneficiaries and 
contractors, inflated invoices and shell companies. 
For example, during one investigation OLAF 
concluded in 2018, the Office uncovered 
fake or incorrect documentation in nine 
ERDF-funded projects implemented under the 
Operational Programme “Innovative Economy” and 
worth more than EUR 4 million. The investigation, 
which took place in Poland and in Germany, revealed 
that one Polish person was managing the business 
activities of four economic operators who were the 
beneficiaries of the projects. During on-the-spot 
checks and inspections conducted in Germany, OLAF 
investigators uncovered that this individual colluded 
with two German contractors in order for the latter 
to issue incorrect or false documents that the Polish 
15
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beneficiaries would submit to the Managing Authority 
in Poland. One German contractor confessed that 
he had issued “courtesy” invoices with artificially 
increased values and that the service agreements 
concluded with the main Polish beneficiary were of 
a fictitious nature. OLAF also established that the 
invoices used to justify the financial transactions had 
been issued for goods and services that were not 
delivered or rendered.   
OLAF therefore concluded the investigation 
with a financial recommendation to the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy to recover approximately EUR 
3.8 million. The Office also issued a judicial 
recommendation to the Polish District Prosecution 
Office to take into consideration the results of OLAF’s 
investigation in the context of the ongoing Polish 
criminal investigation against several individuals 
charged with subsidy fraud, participation in an 
organised crime group, money laundering and gaining 
financial benefits by misleading others. The judicial 
recommendation further advised extending the Polish 
criminal investigation to include the two German 
persons concerned by the OLAF investigation that 
colluded with the Polish beneficiaries and participated 
in the offences committed in Poland.
Similarly, in the course of another cross-border 
investigation concluded by OLAF in 2018, a 
Polish beneficiary received EUR 8 million from 
the ERDF to set up an innovative production line in 
Poland. The production line was delivered to the Polish 
beneficiary company by its German mother company, 
which was selected through a tender procedure. The 
main components of the line, produced by different 
European companies, were provided by a subcontractor 
located in Switzerland, belonging to the same group as 
the German mother company. 
Through activities carried out in Germany, Italy, 
Poland and at the Brussels headquarters, investigators 
uncovered that the tender procedure by which 
the beneficiary granted the contract to its mother 
company had been manipulated. The scope of the 
competitive procedure was unlawfully expanded 
and the mother company was granted the contract 
without a real tender procedure. The purchases of 
some components of the production line had already 
started before the official launch of the project and 
before the tender procedure for the selection of the 
supplier of the production line. The supply chain of the 
major components of the production line was complex 
and OLAF established that this facilitated the price 
of some components to be increased by about 70%. 
16
The OLAF report 2018
OLAF also uncovered close personal and operational 
links between the companies involved which led to a 
conflict of interest.  
As a result, OLAF concluded its investigation 
with financial recommendations to the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy for the recovery of the whole 
EUR 8 million of EU co-financing and a judicial 
recommendation to the Polish prosecution services 
to initiate judicial proceedings in relation to the 
fraudulent activities.   
In another case, OLAF received allegations 
concerning two closely related companies 
which had received European Regional 
Development Funds in order to implement two 
projects aimed at developing circular broadband 
networks in rural Hungary. The total value of 
the two projects, including the ERDF grant and 
the contributions of the two companies was 
approximately EUR 12 million.
OLAF investigators discovered that both 
beneficiaries subcontracted 100% of the works 
to the same general construction company. This 
contractor further subcontracted both jobs through a 
complex chain involving four layers. OLAF established 
that this complex chain was used to disguise the 
transfer of EUR 4.9 million back to one of the 
original beneficiaries in Hungary through a third 
party in another Member State. In this way, the two 
beneficiaries created artificial circumstances in order 
to increase the project value and to receive undue EU 
funding.
OLAF recommended that the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy recover the misused amount of 
roughly EUR 3.6 million. OLAF issued a judicial 
recommendation to the competent national 
authorities to initiate criminal proceedings. 
DOUBLE-FUNDING  
IN THE RESEARCH FIELD
The academic and research fields are not exempt from 
fraud. The cases OLAF concluded in 2018 involved 
fraudulent double-funding, where researchers either 
received both EU and national grants for effectively 
doing the same work or received funds from two 
different European projects.
For example, one OLAF investigation 
concluded in 2018 concerned allegations 
of double-funding for research projects 
carried out by a big international company. The initial 
allegations suggested that the company claimed and 
received funding for the same costs, during the same 
period, from both EU research funds and from Spanish 
Torres Quevedo funds.
OLAF investigators went on-the-spot at the 
premises of the company and acquired digital forensic 
evidence. Key witnesses and persons concerned were 
interviewed. OLAF worked together with the Spanish 
Anti-Fraud Coordination Service, as well as the police, 
judiciary and Managing Authority, whose cooperation 
was crucial to the successful outcome of the case.
OLAF’s investigation confirmed that the company 
participated in eight research projects financed by 
the 7th Framework Programme for Research (FP7), 
while also obtaining 13 Torres Quevedo funding grants. 
In fact, the company claimed personnel costs for 
researchers both from the Torres Quevedo grants and 
from FP7 grants, without disclosing the existence of 
the other source of funding. Not only that, but the 
company specifically submitted declarations to the 
Spanish authority managing the Torres Quevedo grants 
indicating the absence of funding from other sources.  
OLAF calculated the total financial damage and 
issued a corresponding financial recommendation 
to the European Commission Directorate-General 
for Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (DG CNECT). The company repaid 
to DG CNECT EUR 422 000 and to the Spanish 
authority managing the national programme the 
sum of about EUR 960 000. OLAF’s investigation 
also established strong indications that staff of the 
company committed potential crimes under the 
Spanish criminal law and therefore issued judicial 
recommendations to the Spanish judicial authorities. 
The national court proceedings are still ongoing.  
Another OLAF investigation concerned a 
university in the French Caribbean Islands, 
which benefitted from several ERDF 
and ESF-funded projects worth EUR 15 million. In 
particular, a laboratory located in Martinique, which 
was part of the university, initiated three projects in 
the framework of the INTERREG IV Caraïbes Initiative, 
mostly in partnership with Haiti.
OLAF investigators conducted numerous 
interviews with the persons concerned, which 
included high-ranking officials of the university and 
private contractors closely linked to the staff. OLAF 
also heard several witnesses, in close coordination 
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with the French police and Gendarmerie in 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Bordeaux and Paris. Several 
criminal investigations were conducted in parallel with 
OLAF’s administrative investigation.
OLAF investigators discovered that certain 
individuals had attempted to circumvent EU and 
national legislation relevant for public procurement, 
as well as to declare fraudulent mission fees, fake 
diplomas and sham project activity reports. They also 
attempted to use false supporting documents to claim 
the eligibility and reimbursement of costs.
For example, some professors who did not 
contribute at all to the three projects were allegedly 
contributing to seminars and missions, the costs of 
which were charged to the budget of the projects.  
Several professors received payments from 
institutional partners, without approval or even 
knowledge of the university, while being paid full-time 
by their original employer. 
Moreover, one contract was attributed without 
any procurement procedure to a staff member of 
the laboratory in Martinique. The use of “creative 
accounting” practices allowed the laboratory to claim 
reimbursement for various costs without any link to 
the subsidised project - such as social events, sporting 
clothes, very expensive tools or medical items - or to 
re-cycle IT costs incurred in the framework of other 
projects. 
OLAF’s investigation was concluded with 
recommendations to the Directorate-General for 
Regional and Urban Policy and the Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
to recover EUR 4.6 million as well as to the competent 
national judicial authorities. Investigators believe 
that weaknesses in the management systems of the 
beneficiary, which was split over three islands, of 
the Haitian partners and of the French Managing 
Authorities contributed to the magnitude of the fraud. 
INVALID FINANCIAL GUARANTEES AND 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST  
IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
While the correct distribution of development aid 
can make the difference between life and death for 
thousands of people, development projects can also 
fall prey to fraudsters. Many of the places where 
development funds are paid out are not the easiest to 
work in. The general environment can be fragile and 
18
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volatile, subject to frequent and rapid change. This 
makes the risk of fraud and corruption very high, but also 
means that investigating is going to be quite difficult.
OLAF investigators uncovered companies and orga-
ni sations which sometimes use invalid financial 
guarantees to secure EU funds, which means that poor 
performance, irregularities and fraud committed during 
the implementation phase cannot be sanctioned by 
execution of these financial guarantees. 
Conflict of interest also features prominently 
in external aid cases, sometimes involving 
large public procurement projects. For 
example, OLAF received allegations that a local 
agent employed as a project manager in a European 
Union Delegation in Latin America was playing a key 
part in the mismanagement of EU funded projects. 
OLAF investigators went on the ground to carry 
out interviews, perform on-the-spot checks and 
acquire relevant digital evidence. OLAF also collected 
documentary evidence such as invoices, payments, 
contracts and correspondence. 
Investigators established that some of the 
local agent’s family members were involved in the 
implementation of a rural development project he was 
super vising. In addition, the family received consistent 
payments from the Foundation that was implementing 
the project and that was the beneficiary of the EU 
funds. Moreover, OLAF discovered that the project 
in question was only partially implemented by the 
Foundation, that substantial financial irregularities 
were committed and that almost all of the declared 
expenses were ineligible. 
Additional cases of conflict of interests also 
surfaced, as the local agent’s wife provided 
consultancy services in the framework of EU-
funded projects he was in charge of as evaluator 
or programme manager. The local agent was also 
involved in an unauthorised external activity as owner 
of a commercial company.
Immediately after its mission, OLAF asked the EU 
Delegation to adopt precautionary measures in order 
to prevent the local agent from committing further 
irregularities. The EU Delegation dismissed the local 
agent, based on the documentary evidence collected 
by OLAF during the mission, the on-the-spot check at 
the premises of the Foundation and the interview of 
the person concerned.
OLAF also issued a disciplinary recommendation 
concerning the local agent and a financial 
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recommendation aimed at recovering EUR 400 000 
from the beneficiary Foundation.
CORRUPTION AND KICK-BACKS  
IN THIRD COUNTRIES
To solve complex transnational fraud cases and trace 
the proceeds of fraud, OLAF often works together with 
national and international authorities. These authorities 
recognise OLAF as a trusted partner with unique expertise 
in managing cases of fraud and corruption with EU funds, 
and ensuring that the EU budget is well protected. 
In one such investigation concluded in 2018, 
OLAF reached out to the Dutch judiciary to 
acquire information on a Dutch company 
which had allegedly used corruption to manipulate 
several high-value EU tenders. The analysis of digital 
material provided by the Dutch partners, who had 
already conducted a criminal investigation concerning 
corruption in the context of World Bank tenders 
by the same company,  helped OLAF investigators 
spot similar corrupt practices in a EUR 1.5 million 
EU-funded project aimed at  supplying medical 
instruments and equipment in Latin America. 
Through document analysis and on-the-spot 
checks, OLAF investigators established that the Dutch 
company had access to confidential documentation 
and information prior to the publication of the tender 
and had paid bribes to a key person working in the 
organisational structures of the project in Latin 
America. The company had also relied on the services 
of their subcontractor and of a local businessman to 
communicate with the corrupt official and to hide the 
payment of the bribes.
OLAF concluded the investigation with a financial 
reco mmen dation to the Directorate-General for 
Interna tional Coope ration and Development (DG 
DEVCO) to recover the entire amount of EU funds 
disbursed in the context of the project, a judicial 
recommendation to the Dutch Prosecutor, as well as 
an administrative recommendation to DG DEVCO to 
blacklist the Dutch company so it cannot access EU 
funds for a certain number of years. 
Corruption also lay at the heart of an 
investigation OLAF conducted in a Balkan 
country regarding alleged irregularities, 
fraud and corruption committed in the framework of 
projects financed through the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA).  
OLAF’s investigation uncovered a fraudulent scheme, 
involving governmental institutions and officials, set 
up in order to obtain financial benefits in exchange 
for the awarding of EU-funded contracts. An Italian 
company had set up a network of Balkan partners 
which unlawfully supported the company in winning 
EU-funded contracts totalling more than EUR 2 million. 
Through its partners, the Italian company gained access 
to confidential information related to the procurement 
procedures. Additionally, the Italian bidder bribed high-
level public administration officials in order to influence 
the outcome of the work of the evaluation committee 
which eventually awarded the contract to the bidder.
During the course of the investigation, OLAF 
worked together with the Special Prosecutor’s Office 
in the Balkan country, the Prosecutor Office in Milan 
and the Italian Guardia di Finanza. OLAF conducted 
several witness interviews and carried out an on-the-
spot check including a digital forensic operation at the 
premises of the Italian company. 
OLAF concluded its investigation with a financial 
recommendation to the Directorate-General for 
Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiation 
(DG NEAR) to recover the entire amount disbursed, 
and with judicial recommendations to the Italian 
judicial authorities to consider prosecuting the 
persons concerned.
CIGARETTE SMUGGLING  
AND ILLEGAL TOBACCO FACTORIES
OLAF has a unique investigative mandate to combat 
tobacco smuggling into the EU which causes huge revenue 
losses to the budgets of the EU and of the Member 
States. In complex cross-border cases in particular, OLAF 
brings significant added value by helping coordinate 
anti-smuggling operations carried out by customs and 
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law-enforcement agencies across Europe and beyond. 
OLAF works to ensure that contraband cigarettes are 
seized, evaded duties are recovered, criminal smuggling 
networks are dismantled and perpetrators brought 
to justice. International information exchange and 
collaboration facilitated by OLAF led to seizures of more 
than 307 million cigarettes in 2018. Also based on detailed 
information provided by OLAF, four illegal factories were 
raided in Greece and Spain, which led to large seizures of 
tobacco and to over 40 arrests.
For the past years, OLAF has been paying particular 
attention to smuggling by passengers travelling by air 
and who carried significant amounts of cigarettes in 
their luggage. 
For example, OLAF received information 
from reliable sources regarding potential 
smugglers departing from third country 
airports and destined for the EU, allegedly smuggling 
significant quantities of cigarettes in their luggage.
OLAF investigators decided that concerted and 
strategic action should be taken. Therefore, OLAF 
opened a case targeted at increasing controls and 
enhancing information exchange between the 
relevant enforcement authorities. As a result, OLAF 
received information on 377 air passengers which led 
to 157 seizures totalling 3.5 million cigarettes. Some 
of the perpetrators were “frequent flyers” who were 
entitled to carry excess luggage and used this facility 
to assist in the smuggling of the cigarettes. The 
purchase, transport, dissemination and sale of the 
illicit cigarettes in the countries of destination were 
organised by criminal groups based in Eastern Europe 
with connections to Western European criminals who 
received and distributed the cigarettes.
In 2018, OLAF also focused on transit fraud 
involving the misdeclaration of cigarettes 
from Turkey. Two major anti-smuggling 
operations facilitated by OLAF resulted in the seizures 
of more than 130 million cigarettes by Belgian and 
Dutch authorities. The cigarettes, originating from a 
Turkish company, had arrived in the ports of Antwerp 
and Rotterdam either mis-described as other goods or 
declared to be in transit to a non-EU country. Smugglers 
tried to unlawfully discharge the cigarettes during their 
road transport between the port of arrival and the 
declared port of departure from the European Union.
OLAF and Member State Customs work together to keep our borders safe
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As a result of OLAF intelligence, the Dutch Fiscal 
Intelligence and Investigation Service seized 45 million 
cigarettes, two trucks and EUR 130 000 in cash. In 
addition, the operation also led to the dismantling of 
an illegal cigarette production site.
SMUGGLING WATER PIPE TOBACCO
In October 2018, OLAF started monitoring 
movements of water pipe tobacco declared 
under the EU transit system, as it was 
considered to be at a high risk of smuggling into 
the EU. As a result of this monitoring operation, in 
November OLAF identified a suspicious consignment 
originating in Turkey and declared as destined for the 
United Kingdom.
OLAF’s analysis revealed that the consignee did 
not actually exist, so OLAF investigators shared this 
information with France, Germany and Italy, the 
Member States that the shipment was transiting. OLAF 
also coordinated the exchange of information between 
the Member States involved, which confirmed that 
the goods were in France after the consignment had 
arrived from Turkey through Italy and Germany. 
It was discovered that the transit document had 
been closed in Germany using false documents, and 
that the water pipe tobacco had been declared as 
“machinery.”
As a result of the information provided by OLAF, 
in November the French National Customs Operation 
Unit seized approximately seven tons of water pipe 
tobacco and arrested three persons. 
OLAF identified a further two suspicious shipments 
of water pipe tobacco transiting the EU and destined 
for North Africa, which were subsequently diverted 
to Lithuania. The cooperation with the Lithuanian 
Customs Criminal Service on these shipments resulted 
in approximately three more tons being seized.
OLAF AT THE HELM  
OF TRANS-EUROPEAN JOINT  
CUSTOMS OPERATIONS
In addition to its investigations concerning cases 
of revenue fraud, OLAF coordinates large-scale 
Joint Customs Operations (JCOs) involving EU and 
international operational partners. JCOs are targeted 
actions of limited duration that aim to combat fraud 
and the smuggling of sensitive goods in specific areas 
at risk and/or on identified trade routes. In 2018, OLAF 
co-organised or provided support in five Joint Customs 
Operations. The Virtual Operations Coordination Unit 
(VOCU) module of the Anti-Fraud Information System 
(AFIS) was used for the secure exchange of information 
in four of these JCOs. The Permanent Operational 
Coordination Unit (POCU) in OLAF was used to support 
Poseidon. This JCO was financed by OLAF.
Operation Silver Axe III was coordinated by Europol 
with support from OLAF, and led to the seizure of 360 
tons of illegal or counterfeit pesticides. Numerous 
police, customs and plant protection authorities from 
27 countries participated in the Operation. As part of 
the Operation, checks took place at major seaports, 
airports and land borders, as well as at production and 
repacking facilities in the participating countries.
During the operational phase, OLAF selected 181 
suspicious shipments of pesticides coming from third 
countries (mainly China), that were either declared as 
being in transit in the EU or declared as being for export 
from the EU to another third country (Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Turkey). These suspicious shipments were 
notified to the participating national and third country 
customs authorities by OLAF directly or via Europol.
For example, OLAF asked Hungarian and Slovak 
customs to intercept a suspicious consignment of 
20,400 kg pesticides (thiamethoxam 350 g/l) on its 
way from China to Hungary via Ukraine. The shipment 
containing unmarked packaging (no indication 
of producer, country of origin, trade name) was 
Figure 6: Cigarettes seized with the support of OLAF (rounded to million sticks) 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Coordination and investigation 
cases/Exchange of information
168 602 458 470 302
JCOs 132 17 11 75 48
Total 300 619 469 545 350
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successfully seized at Szolnok by Hungarian customs 
officers (NTCA) and the experts from the National 
Food Chain Safety Office (NFCSO). The real customs 
value of the shipment exceeded USD 240  000. The 
retail value of the genuine pesticide would exceed 
USD  1  million. In addition, OLAF also contributed to 
stopping another suspicious shipment of 5.4 tons of 
pesticide (thiacloprid) initially transported under a 
customs transit regime from Turkey to Germany and 
later on from Germany to Czechia.
Joint Border Control Operation (JBCO) Janus was 
co-organised by the European Union Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and OLAF. 
The operation targeted the smuggling of tobacco 
products at the EU Eastern border and resulted in the 
seizure of more than seven million cigarettes.
Joint Action Hansa, an operation driven by United 
Kingdom customs in co-operation with Europol, 
targeted the internal movement of illegal excisable 
goods, mainly cigarettes. The action resulted in the 
seizure of 41  million cigarettes and 11.5 tons of raw 
tobacco.
JCO Marco was a regional maritime surveillance 
operation coordinated by French customs, which 
targeted the detection of illicit trafficking of sensitive 
goods by sea, in the area of the Atlantic.
Data analysis  
to facilitate the work  
of customs authorities
During 2018, OLAF started a Hercule III‑funded 
project, working with the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre, to support and facilitate 
the analytical work of customs services in 
Member States in order to effectively and 
efficiently use data and analytical approaches to 
address fraud in the customs area.
Activities in this first year focused on 
establishing a community of practice among 
Member States’ customs and included a 
consultation on needs and priorities, two 
workshops to discuss current practices and 
agree on areas of interest and five visits to 
Member States to share information about their 
analytical projects and associated challenges.
The positive feedback from the community 
clearly showed that this project has already had a 
positive impact in strengthening the know‑how 
and collaboration among experts. The findings 
affirm that customs fraud, notably in the context 
of e‑commerce, remains a priority for all EU 
customs administrations, some of whom address 
this priority by investing substantial resources 
in data analysis and obtain important results. 
On the other hand, organised crime groups 
are involved in some areas of customs fraud 
and often their illegal activities span several 
risk areas (undervaluation, mis‑declaration of 
origin, mis‑description of goods, illicit tobacco, 
etc.), they act in multiple Member States and 
exploit the structure of the EU single market. 
This project will be continued in 2019 with 
focus on specific research projects and support 
activities discussed and agreed with Member 
States’ customs.
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2.3. OLAF’s investigative mandate 
within the EU institutions
OLAF has a unique mandate to carry out internal 
investigations into the EU institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies for the purpose of fighting fraud, corruption and 
any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of 
the Union. The Office investigates serious matters relating 
to the discharge of professional duties constituting a 
dereliction of the obligations of EU officials liable to result 
in disciplinary or, as the case may be, criminal proceedings, 
or an equivalent failure to discharge obligations on the 
part of Members of institutions and bodies. Indeed, any 
perceived lack of integrity within the institutions presents 
a reputational risk not only to the institutions themselves, 
but also to the European project as a whole. OLAF also 
works with the EU institutions and bodies to help them 
detect, prevent and address any such possible cases.
For example, an OLAF investigation concluded 
in 2018, revealed that a former Member of an EU 
Institution carried out many “missions” which 
were not related to the performance of his/her duties, and 
used the institution’s funds for representation expenses 
and for private events. The initial allegations were 
submitted to OLAF by the EU Institution in question. The 
investigation also established that the Member was absent 
from the institution for 128 days without any justification 
and that the fuel cards, put at the Member’s disposal, 
were also used for activities that were not linked to the 
fulfilment of his/her mandate. The use of the institution’s 
resources for private purposes is not in compliance with 
the applicable financial rules and ethical guidelines. 
In this light, OLAF recommended disciplinary 
measures and the recovery of more than EUR 500 000.
In addition, OLAF issued a judicial recommendation 
taking into account that the Member deliberately 
misrepresented the private nature of at least five 
significant missions. These facts may constitute a 
criminal offence pursuant to the applicable criminal 
law and OLAF issued a corresponding judicial 
recommendation. 
The investigation revealed that the Member failed 
to declare his/her external activities related to the 
management board of a national political party and 
his/her position as managing director of a real estate 
company. The Member also transmitted confidential 
special reports to unauthorised persons. 
In 2018, OLAF also dealt with a significant number of 
cases related to EU Agencies as well as to Delegations 
to third countries.
One OLAF investigation stemmed from an 
anonymous source reporting the alleged 
misconduct by the Executive Director of an 
EU Agency. The allegations referred to irregularities 
in procurement procedures and to alleged 
mismanagement of financial and human resources. 
OLAF investigators looked into specific cases of 
procurement where exception procedures were used 
despite the fact that the conditions for their use were not 
met. OLAF established that the Executive Director failed 
to ensure that specific procurement procedures were 
conducted in line with the principles of sound financial 
management, open competition and transparency. This 
Figure 7: Investigations into EU staff and members of the institutions concluded in 2018
Institution, body office, agency Cases concluded
Total number of which, concluded with 
recommendations
European Commission 9 7
European Parliament 8 2
Agencies 5 3
European Court of Justice 1 1
European Court of Auditors 1 1
European External Action Service 2 2
Committee of the Regions 1 1
Total 27 17
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resulted in an unjustified expenditure for the Agency 
and exposed the Agency to a high risk of litigation.
OLAF also examined specific cases of expenditure, 
including settlement agreements with Agency 
staff members. These were found to be excessive, 
inappropriate, against the interests of the Agency and 
against the sound financial management principle. 
In relation to the mismanagement of human 
resources, OLAF established that the Executive Director 
abused his position as line manager in relation to 
recruitment procedures, termination and non-extension 
of contracts, working conditions, task assignments and 
non-respect of the positions of his line managers.
In his behaviour towards members of staff, the 
Director undermined the personal and professional 
dignity of those who raised concerns in relation to the 
regularity and appropriateness of his decisions.
In light of the OLAF investigation and mounting 
pressure from the staff of the Agency, the 
Executive  Director resigned from his position, 
which was welcomed by the Management Board 
of the Agency. OLAF recommended the recovery 
of a substantial amount from the Executive 
Director and invited the Agency to determine 
other specific amounts resulting from unjustified 
expenditure. OLAF addressed recommendations 
for disciplinary action to the Agency’s Management 
Board concerning its former Executive Director. 
Recommendations were also issued against several 
members of staff.
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3. Focus chapter: OLAF protects EU money 
from the claws of organised criminals
In recent years, OLAF investigations have become 
more and more complex. Instead of localised fraud, 
set in one region or country, OLAF investigators are 
faced with increasingly transnational cases, with 
fraudsters operating across several Member States and 
sometimes beyond them. Organised criminals defraud 
EU funds and abuse EU and national rules by hiding 
their tracks and activities around Europe. They skillfully 
exploit every possibility to try to appropriate EU funds 
by manipulating procurement procedures, receiving 
agricultural grants for plots of land they did not farm, 
or misdeclaring imports to avoid paying customs fees. 
In this chapter, we will delve deeper into the workings 
of organised criminals attempting to steal EU money 
and show you how OLAF goes after these groups 
across EU borders. OLAF intervention is frequently 
the only chance that Europe has to protect its money 
and ensure EU funds go to legitimate projects which 
improve the lives of European citizens. Work begins 
often by detecting situations that look suspicious 
only if seen from a cross-border perspective. OLAF 
can put together information and data that would not 
necessarily appear illegal if looked at from a national 
perspective only.
3.1. Fraud in the promotion  
of agricultural products
In the past years, OLAF investigators have been dealing 
with an increase in a subset of cases - those of alleged 
fraud in the promotion of EU agricultural products. 
Fraudsters try to circumvent EU rules by setting up fake 
companies to act as bidders in tender procedures or to 
pretend to supply services or to help inflate invoices. 
Defrauded funds are then laundered through bank 
accounts, usually in third countries. 
For example, OLAF concluded a string 
of investigations relating to the same 
perpetrators who were applying similar 
methods to defraud EU funds in a large number of 
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projects aimed at promoting EU dairy products in 
Europe and in third countries. The perpetrators, 
operating through a Brussels-based company and via 
a network of shell companies, would approach trade 
associations in the Member State offering to help 
them secure EU funding – a “turn-key” solution for 
the successful approval of their proposals, as well as 
practical support for their future implementation. 
The fraudsters would even go as far as to lend the 
“applicants” the 20% co-funding contribution of 
the beneficiary and the related 15% performance 
guarantee required by the relevant legislation. In this 
manner, some agricultural producers’ associations 
obtained EU funding to organise and implement 
promotion activities of agricultural products in 
Europe and in third countries such as the United Arab 
Emirates, Russia, Australia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
The fraudsters would then create a circle of shell 
companies under their control, to fulfil the roles of 
tenderers, suppliers and implementing body for the 
beneficiaries.
Through more than 30 on-the-spot checks in 
different Member States, as well as interviews with 
witnesses and persons concerned and forensic data 
acquisition, OLAF investigators got to the bottom of 
the case. They discovered that the fraudsters were 
colluding with the beneficiaries and other commercial 
partners and manipulating tender procedures by 
using misleading documents and resorting to kick-
back payments. These fraudsters would then use shell 
companies, which had neither operating premises 
nor employees, in order to inflate prices for services 
that were only partly, or sometimes never delivered. 
Money was then laundered through bank accounts 
in Europe and in third countries such as Ukraine 
and the British Virgin Islands. In particular, with the 
support of the Belgian national authorities, OLAF was 
able to uncover that one of the persons concerned 
received high amounts in his bank accounts, which he 
transferred almost immediately, without any kind of 
economic justification or business purposes. 
OLAF’s investigations were concluded with 
financial recommendations to the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture 
and Rural Development to recover EUR 7.7 million 
and prevent the disbursement of an additional EUR 
7.3 million, and judicial recommendations to the 
Prosecutor’s Offices of Brussels and Sofia.  
3.2. False farmers and ghost herds
When it comes to fighting complex fraud cases 
perpetrated by highly-organised criminals, experience 
comes in handy. OLAF investigators are not only 
dedicated, they also have years of practice behind them. 
This helps them quickly identify patterns and apply the 
knowledge they have gathered to not only solve cases 
quicker, but to identify new potential areas of fraud.
As outlined in last year’s report, for example, OLAF 
has looked into suspected fraud involving ineligible 
applications for EU agricultural subsidies in Italy. This 
became known as the “False farmers” case, as fraudsters 
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had submitted aid applications under the names of 
deceased persons, with false lease contracts and using 
land that was ineligible for agricultural subsidies. In 
this instance, OLAF and the Italian law enforcement 
authorities uncovered not only a very elaborate and 
wide-ranging fraud scheme, but also possible links to 
Mafia organisations.
Fearing that the same fraud pattern could have been used 
by criminals in other European countries, investigators 
looked everywhere in Europe. Their instincts were right, 
as it became clear that this “False farmers” scheme has 
been exported beyond the borders of Italy.
For example, OLAF has been looking 
into systematic abuses regarding direct 
payments to individual farmers in France. 
OLAF investigators discovered claims for EU support 
for large and remote plots of land that were not 
actually farmed, claims for plots of land belonging to 
other individuals who had not granted appropriate 
permission, the so-called “agro-pirate” cases, or for 
“ghost-herds”, which are animals that were never 
properly identified and unlikely to exist. OLAF also 
uncovered claims for EU support for plots of land 
where no entitlements for farming could be provided 
by the beneficiary or simply claims for plots that were 
not even farmed. 
In the course of one investigation, OLAF discovered 
that claims were submitted for several years in Corsica 
for parcels of land in mountainous areas without any 
suitable infrastructure that would allow for farming, 
such as access track, water supply, corrals or feeding 
facilities. Fraudsters also submitted applications 
for parcels of land despite the fierce opposition of 
the legitimate owners, or for herds which were not 
properly tagged or even non-existent.
In another investigation, OLAF could identify an 
application for payment submitted by a full-time 
hairdresser for very steep cliffs where no animal had 
ever set foot. Still another application was submitted 
by a farmer for a tiny parcel of land belonging to the 
managing authority itself.
OLAF investigators conducted interviews with 
the persons concerned, carried out on the spot 
checks and held numerous operational meetings with 
the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DG AGRI) and the national managing 
authorities, external services of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, judicial authorities and the police. 
As a result, investigators not only uncovered 
several fraud cases, but also put together evidence 
that the complexity of the successive layers of 
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legislation applicable to agricultural payments, 
updated annually, was an important factor in creating 
legal uncertainty and led to difficulties in properly 
implementing, monitoring and controlling where the 
money goes exactly.
OLAF concluded its investigation with a financial 
recommendation to the Directorate-General for 
Agriculture (DG AGRI) for the recovery of roughly 
EUR 536 000, as well as with an administrative 
recommendation to improve the management system 
of direct subsidies in Corsica, in order to prevent 
further abuses. OLAF’s investigation also triggered 
an audit by DG AGRI, additional targeted inspections 
by national authorities and various expert missions by 
the French General Inspectorates. 
Claiming EU funds for plots of land is not the 
only way organised criminals try to pocket 
EU cash. OLAF investigators have also noted 
an increase in cases where several entities act in a 
concerted manner in order to fraudulently access EU 
funds. OLAF discovered that established agricultural 
operators in Bulgaria, who were past beneficiaries 
of EU agricultural funds, attempted to expand their 
operations and holdings by creating and using new, 
and seemingly independent, operators.
The fraud scheme operated in the following 
manner: an established known operator reaches the 
limit for the total eligible cost for EU financial support 
for his holding or group of holdings. As a result, this 
operator cannot legitimately obtain further funding 
to expand his business. Instead, other “independent” 
entities, which are actually under the control of the 
initial operator, apply and obtain EU funds. 
The new “independent” operators are either set 
up especially for this purpose, or they already exist 
through a creative legal restructuring that makes them 
appear like they are not under any formal control. 
In reality, they are managed by the operator: they 
usually share an equity provider, guarantor, creditor or 
landlord, and they have an identical or complementing 
core business. Also, many times, the physical location 
of their holding, the address for correspondence and 
their choice of suppliers and outlets are the same as 
that of the established operator.
This type of fraud is not only damaging for EU 
financial interests, but it also distorts free and fair 
competition, prevents the growth of agricultural 
operators and stems private initiatives. The combined 
financial impact of the cases OLAF has analysed so far 
is roughly EUR 10 million.
3.3. Organised crime in IT projects
Some criminals go to great lengths to pocket 
EU cash. OLAF discovered that an economic 
operator in Poland had devised a whole 
system aimed overwhelmingly and increasingly at 
defrauding public funds and systematically abusing 
tendering procedures.
OLAF investigators found out that the economic 
operator had implemented 10 projects with an overall 
Figure 9: Fraud in the IT field
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A Polish company devised a 
system to defraud public funds 
and abuse tendering procedures.
The operator implemented projects 
worth €10 million.
They also provided consulting 
services on obtaining EU funding 
worth another several million.
OLAF digital forensics found 
a complex web of companies which:
- set up tenders,
- provided false statements,
- misrepresented activities in EU projects.
The company had covered its tracks using shell 
companies in the United Arab Emirates.
OLAF recommended 
the recovery of €10 
million.
Criminal proceedings into 
the company’s activities 
were launched in Poland.
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value of about EUR 10 million, and which were likely 
to have been affected by fraud or irregularities. Most 
of the funds went towards IT-centred work, including 
projects concerning the creation or the acquisition 
of software. In addition, OLAF realised that the 
economic operator provided consulting services on 
obtaining EU funding, which meant that dozens of 
additional EU co-funded projects, worth millions of 
euros in public funding, could be affected by fraud as 
well.
Given the vast scope of the company’s activities, 
OLAF decided that only a complex digital forensic 
analysis would give investigators the possibility to 
determine whether the activities were fraudulent and 
to reconstruct the whole picture of the fraud.
Following the analysis of the data, OLAF uncovered 
an intricate fraud scheme, conducted with the 
involvement of many employees. Investigators 
discovered an orchestrated system of companies 
which systematically rigged tenders, provided false 
statements of facts towards managing authorities, 
misrepresented the activities conducted within EU 
co-funded projects and led external stakeholders 
into committing irregularities or fraud. The group 
consisted of companies which were formally 
independent but in reality formed one economic 
body. Additional companies owned by employees 
of the economic operator and collaborating third 
party economic operators completed the picture. The 
existing connections between the companies were 
concealed from the Polish authorities through the use 
of shell companies from the United Arab Emirates. The 
apparent suppliers employed the same staff as the 
person concerned or provided paper services to the 
person concerned in order to circulate the money.
OLAF concluded its investigation with a financial 
recommendation to the Directorate-General 
for Regional and Urban Policy and a judicial 
recommendation to the Polish General Prosecutor. 
Criminal proceedings into the company’s activities 
were launched in Poland.
3.4. OLAF stops organised crime 
group trying to pocket money for 
refugee camps 
With conflicts in Syria and in many other parts of the 
world forcing millions of people to flee their homes and 
to seek refuge elsewhere, the European Union stepped 
up its efforts as a leading donor, providing emergency 
assistance, such as medical and food aid, water and 
shelter. However, reports started coming in that several 
refugee centres were badly maintained and that the 
conditions did not live up to the standards of funding 
provided. OLAF started looking into the matter, to 
ensure that there is no foul play. An investigation 
OLAF concluded into a project financed by the 
European Refugee Fund (ERF) for the management 
of accommodation centres for asylum seekers and 
refugees in Italy revealed that the situation was dire.
Not only did OLAF’s investigation uncover 
irregularities in the execution of the public 
procurement and little control over the 
implementation of the project, but it also exposed 
outright fraud in declaring the quantity of meals 
supplied to the asylum-seekers, refugees and people 
in need accommodated at the centres, who were often 
left starving or nourished with food products bordering 
the limits of edibility. OLAF’s investigation also 
unveiled connections among companies, interaction 
with criminal organised groups and serious crimes 
aimed at manipulating public procurement and illegally 
obtaining public funding. In particular, OLAF uncovered 
that the awarding body delegated the execution of the 
entire project to its local partner, in breach of public 
procurement rules, withholding a lump-sum of 5%. The 
two bodies had entered into a private agreement that 
was never notified to the contracting authority, which 
therefore could not perform the necessary checks. 
Several breaches of the Italian Public Procurement Code 
were detected, which ultimately led to the violation of 
traceability of financial flows, including the required 
anti-mafia checks. The competent Anti-Mafia Public 
Prosecutor’s Office of Cantazaro in Italy has launched 
an investigation against 84 persons concerned, as it is 
believed they could be linked to mafia groups. 
OLAF investigators conducted on-the-spot 
checks, held coordination meetings and cooperated 
with the local Unit of the Guardia di Finanza, the 
competent Italian judicial authorities, and received 
30
The OLAF report 2018
significant technical support from the Italian National 
Anticorruption Authority.
As a result, OLAF recommended that the 
Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
(DG HOME) of the European Commission exclude from 
funding nearly EUR 1.2 million, the full amount of the 
EU contribution, and issued a judicial recommendation 
to the competent District Anti-Mafia Directorate 
to take into consideration OLAF’s findings in the 
framework of the ongoing criminal proceedings.
3.5. OLAF tackles VAT fraud  
with high-value electronics
VAT fraud is a major problem throughout the EU. While 
trade facilitation regimes allow for VAT to be paid in the 
Member State the goods are destined for, this can be 
abused by fraudsters to avoid paying duties altogether. 
Criminals come up with complex carousel schemes, 
whereby the same goods are bought and resold several 
times via middlemen. Each time, the amount of tax 
owed increases but the company either disappears or 
becomes insolvent before the tax authority can collect 
the accumulated VAT. The fraudulent financial profits 
from these schemes are then often laundered. 
OLAF is mandated at European level to protect the 
financial interests of the EU from fraud. In this context, 
in 2018, OLAF supported the efforts of Italian and 
Romanian law enforcement officials in putting an end 
to a fraudulent pattern involving high-value electronics.
Working together, the Romanian National 
Anti-corruption Directorate (DNA), the 
Italian Guardia di Finanza and OLAF 
discovered that a complex carousel fraud scheme was 
set up to evade VAT duties on the sale of electronic 
devices. Fraudsters would avoid paying VAT to Italian 
authorities using shell companies throughout Europe 
and foreign bank accounts to hide their identity. The 
amount of evaded VAT is estimated at around EUR 30 
million. 
OLAF supported the Italian Prosecutor by liaising 
with the Romanian authorities and alerting them to 
the fact that the fraudsters were using Romanian 
frontmen and companies. In October 2018, the three 
bodies organised a joint operation in which they 
searched the homes and offices of several individuals 
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in Romania. Eight persons suspected of being part of 
a transnational organised criminal group have been 
interviewed by law enforcement officials.
A European Investigative Order was addressed 
by the Italian Prosecutor to the Romanian judicial 
authorities. Romanian magistrates consequently 
allowed Italian Guardia di Finanza officers to carry out 
joint searches in Romania, together with the DNA. 
OLAF investigators participated in the operation on 
the ground.
3.6. Further successes in string  
of undervaluation cases
For the past several years, OLAF has been fighting a 
very particular type of fraud - the undervaluation of 
textiles and footwear entering the European Union and 
going through customs clearance in several Member 
States, such as the United Kingdom, Slovakia, Czechia 
and Greece. While several EU customs procedures allow 
importers to clear their goods at the customs point of 
their choice, rather than at the point of entry into the 
customs territory, organised criminal networks are apt 
at identifying those entry points where they perceive 
the controls to be more lax. 
This was clearly evident throughout 2017 and 2018 with 
a substantial increase in the volume of such goods being 
brought into countries like Greece and Hungary, and a 
corresponding decrease in the volumes that were being 
declared for import into the Member States that had 
been previously targeted, but where authorities had 
taken action. OLAF’s investigation uncovered a direct 
correlation between implementing risk profiles, which 
prompt customs officers to deal with the risk indicated, 
such as to physically examine a container or to check 
the customs declaration and accompanying documents, 
and diminishing traffic.
The latest in these undervaluation cases was concluded 
concerning the fraudulent import of textiles and shoes 
into Greece between 1 January 2015 and 31 May 2018. 
Figure 10: Carousel fraud to evade paying VAT
OLAF supports communications 
between Italy and Romanian partners
The fraudsters were using Romanian 
frontmen and companies.
OLAF alerts Romanian authorities from the 
National Anti-corruption Directorate (DNA).
OLAF, GdF and DNA plan 
joint operation.
OLAF and partners 
stop criminal operation
Investigators search homes and oﬃces 
of several individuals in Romania.
OLAF investigators participated in the 
operation on the ground.
Eight persons suspected of being part 
of the transnational organised group 




Trade facilitation regimes 
allow for VAT to be paid in the Member 
State the goods are destined for.
This can be abused by fraudsters who avoid 
paying duties altogether.
Criminals come up with complex carousel 
schemes, whereby the same goods are bought and 
resold several times via middlemem.
Each time, the amount of tax owed increases  but 
the company either disapperars or becomes 
insolvent before the tax authority can collect the 
accumulated VAT.
Criminal group runs carousel fraud 
scheme worth €30 million
OLAF and the Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF) 
discover a complex, transnational fraud scheme.
Fraudsters evade VAT duties on the sale of 
high-value electronic devices in Italy.
They use shell companies 
throughout Europe and 
foreign bank accounts to 
hide their identity.
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OLAF carried out an extensive analysis of all customs 
declarations presented in Greece for all imports of 
textiles and shoes from China between 2015 and 2018. 
As a result, OLAF found that there was organised and 
systematic fraudulent undervaluation of these products 
at import in the period concerned in Greece.
Based on its findings, OLAF issued a financial 
recommendation to Greek customs to recover the sum 
of EUR 202.3 million in lost customs duties. In concluding 
the case, OLAF also sent a judicial recommendation to 
the Office of the Public Prosecutor against Financial 
Crimes in Greece asking it to take OLAF’s findings into 
account in its ongoing separate judicial investigations 
into particular cases of such fraudulent imports into 
Greece.
The closure of this case brings the total number of 
undervaluation cases that OLAF has concluded in the 
past two years to six. In these six cases combined, 
OLAF has made financial recommendations totalling 
over EUR 2.5 billion amounting to the customs duties 
denied to the EU budget. The associated estimated 
financial losses in VAT payments, which would be due 
to national budgets and part of which would also be due 
to the EU budget, are of an even greater amount.
This string of cases uncovered by OLAF shows that 
organised networks of fraudsters are targeting the 
EU as a whole by selecting those entry points where 
they perceive the entry to be easier at one particular 
time. Both the Member States and the EU as a whole 
are victims of this organised crime. There is a clear need 
for more cooperation between customs offices in the 
Member States in order to deal in a coordinated way 
with these criminal networks.
OLAF continues to work closely with the various services 
of all Member States affected by this irregular trade. Such 
work comprises ongoing investigations, early warnings 
and alerts to Member States in relation to surges in 
suspicious trade flows, precautionary measures to be 
taken by Member States and other actions designed to 
combat this large-scale organised fraud.
33
The OLAF report 2018
4. OLAF on the European  
and international scene
4.1. OLAF relations  
with its partners
Both from an investigative and policy-making 
perspective, the work carried out by OLAF can only lead 
to tangible results on the ground if the Office succeeds 
in joining forces with other European and international 
institutions to engage in the global fight against fraud 
and corruption. In 2018, OLAF continued to develop 
existing partnerships and to enter into arrangements 
with new partners worldwide.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION 
ARRANGEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
EVENTS WITH KEY PARTNERS
Administrative Cooperation Arrangements (ACAs) are 
instrumental in helping OLAF to foster close relations 
with investigative bodies and other non-investigative 
partners engaged in the fight against fraud. In 2018, 
OLAF concluded two ACAs with international partners, 
namely the African Development Bank and the Office 
of the Inspector General of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
OLAF stepped up its international engagement by 
organising several events with partner authorities, 
such as the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) 
seminar in the Western Balkans, and the anti-fraud 
workshop with competent Ukrainian authorities. 
In addition, OLAF participated in numerous international 
events, such as the annual conference of the European 
Partners against Corruption/European Anti-Corruption 
Contact-point Network (EPAC/EACN), the Forum 
of General Inspections of African States (FIGE), the 
Conference of International Investigators (CII) and in 
the meeting of the Syria Investigations Working Group, 
which comprises national and international authorities 
providing humanitarian assistance to Syria.
B. ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR 
COORDINATION OF FRAUD PREVENTION 
(COCOLAF)
OLAF steers and chairs the Advisory Committee for 
the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF), 
composed of representatives of Member States’ 
authorities. The 2018 annual COCOLAF meeting 
provided an opportunity to exchange views on the 
main developments in the fight against fraud and the 
preparation of the Article 325 TFEU Report on the 
“Protection of the European Union’s financial interests 
— Fight against fraud 2017”.
In 2018, the specific COCOLAF subgroups worked on:
  discussing OLAF cooperation with AFCOS, both 
from an investigative and from a policy perspective;
  exchanging best practice and developing a common 
framework for fraud prevention and detection;
  sharing the results of analyses about main fraud 
and irregularity trends and patterns and working on 
developing a “Methodology for country profiles in 
the anti-fraud area”;
  sharing media strategies and organising 
communication activities on fraud prevention and 
deterrence.
C. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE  
AND ANTI-FRAUD CLAUSES  
IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Cooperation with third countries with a view to 
preventing, detecting and combating breaches of 
customs legislation is based on agreements on mutual 
administrative assistance in customs matters. Such 
agreements provide the required legal basis in the 
context of Article 19 of Regulation 515/97 for the 
exchange of information with third countries on fraud 
or irregularities. Agreements with more than 80 third 
countries are currently in place, including with major 
EU trade partners, like the US, China or Japan. In 2018, 
the agreement with New Zealand entered into force. 
In addition, negotiations have been finalised with 
Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
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and Chile, and are ongoing with Australia, Indonesia, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
These free trade agreements usually contain an anti-
fraud clause which allows for a temporary withdrawal 
of tariff preference for a product in cases of serious 
customs fraud and a persistent lack of adequate 
cooperation to combat it. OLAF represents the EU in 
negotiations of the clause. In 2018, negotiations on the 
clause were completed with Mexico and Mercosur, and 
good progress was made in ongoing negotiations with 
Australia, Chile and Tunisia. Discussions with Andorra 
on strengthening its tobacco control framework also 
moved forward.
Since February 2017, Article 12 of WTO Trade facilitation 
Agreement (Bali Agreement) has provided for an 
additional possibility to exchange information with 
third countries with the purpose of verifying an import 
or export declaration where there are reasonable 
grounds to doubt the truth or accuracy of the 
declaration. At the end of 2018, the WTO Agreement 
counted 139 members. OLAF is monitoring progress in 
implementing this article. 
4.2. The Hercule III Programme:  
a key tool in supporting  
the fight against fraud  
across the EU
OLAF is responsible for the management of the 
Hercule III Programme which supports actions and 
projects that aim to protect the financial interests of 
the EU. The Programme has a budget of over EUR 100 
million for the period 2014-2020. It is implemented on 
the basis of annual work programmes setting out the 
budget and the funding priorities for a given calendar 
year. The annual work programme for 2018 made a 
budget of EUR 15.35 million available for the purchase 
of, for example, specialised technical equipment by 
law enforcement agencies in the Member States, 
such as customs or police forces. The financial 
support was used for the purchase of a wide range of 
technical equipment, like scanners used in harbours 
or airports, digital forensic software and hardware, 
or for the purchase and training of sniffer dogs. The 
law enforcement authorities were also assisted in 
their operations and investigations through procured 
OLAF Director-General Ville Itälä chairing AFCOS 2018 meeting
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access to commercial databases. The Programme also 
supported conferences, seminars and training events 
attended by staff of national administrations, law 
enforcement agencies and NGOs in order to strengthen 
mutual cooperation or the exchange of best practice. 
The Programme also funded two sessions of digital 
forensics and analysis training aimed at improving the 
skills of anti-fraud professionals in collecting, securing 
and analysing evidence from digital devices.
Vehicle scanner purchased by Finnish customs through the 
Hercule Programme managed by OLAF
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5. Monitoring the actions taken by the 
recipients of OLAF recommendations 
5.1. Financial monitoring
OLAF INVESTIGATIONS LEAD TO 
SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL RECOVERIES
Financial recommendations are addressed by OLAF to 
the EU institutions or national authorities providing 
or managing EU funds. The aim of such financial 
recommendations is to seek the recovery of defrauded 
EU funds to the EU budget. The sum recommended by 
OLAF for recovery each year depends on the scope and 
scale of the investigations concluded in that given year. 
The amount of recommended recoveries is therefore 
not an indication of the overall fraud level in Europe, 
but relates to specific investigations OLAF has finalised 
in a particular year.
As a result of the investigations it concluded in 2018, 
OLAF has recommended the recovery of EUR 371 
million to the EU budget. 
It is worth highlighting that OLAF is not itself 
responsible for the recovery of these funds. Relevant 
authorities at EU and Member State level can retrieve 
this money from the beneficiaries of the funds, national 
managing authorities or paying agencies in a number of 
ways, including direct recovery, offsetting, deduction, 
de-commitment, programme closure or clearance of 
accounts.
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF OLAF’S 
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE OVERALL 
DETECTION OF IRREGULARITIES ACROSS 
EU
Member States are responsible for most of EU spending 
and they also manage the collection of the EU’s customs 
revenue. Their activities represent the first line of 
defence against any attempt to defraud the EU budget. 
OLAF counts on national authorities to perform their 
work efficiently and diligently, and supports them 
through an active exchange of information and via 
targeted trainings. 
Under sectoral regulations, Member States have to 
report any irregularity or suspicion of fraud1 they detect 
exceeding EUR 10 000 to the European Commission. An 
analysis of these data is compiled in the Commission’s 
Annual Report on the protection of the EU financial 
interests (the so-called “PIF Report”).
In parallel with data concerning Member States’ 
detections, OLAF also gathers data on the number of 
investigations it has concluded and which have led to 
financial recommendations.
In recent annual Reports, OLAF presented a comparative 
analysis in the areas of Traditional Own Resources (TOR) 
and shared management, providing an overview of the 
number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities 
detected by national authorities, compared to the 
financial recommendations issued by OLAF in the 
same areas. In this year’s Report, the analysis covers 
(1)  A case can be defined as fraud only after a definitive sentence 
is issued by a competent judicial authority. This can take a few 
years following the detection and reporting of the case to the 
Commission.
Figure 11: Amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in 2018 (in million euros)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Amounts recommended 284 403 901 888 631 3 095 371
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a period of five years, from 2014 to 2018. The impact 
of investigations is shown as a percentage of the 
total Traditional Own Resources that authorities have 
collected for the years 2014-2018 and as a percentage 
of the total payments made under the two main areas 
of shared management by each Member State. The 
results obtained by OLAF during the same period are 
presented next to those of national authorities2.
For the purpose of our analysis, it is assumed that 
financial recommendations issued by OLAF following 
investigations are comparable to the financial impact of 
irregularities detected and reported by Member States.
Figure 12 shows the number of irregularities/fraud 
cases detected in the area of Traditional Own Resources 
between 2014 and 2018 and the percentage that their 
financial impact represents in terms of the gross TOR 
collected by Member States and made available to the 
EU budget. OLAF results are shown alongside those of 
national authorities. 
Figure 13 shows the number of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent irregularities detected in the two main 
areas of shared management, European Structural and 
Investment Funds and Agriculture, from 2014-2018 and 
their financial impact expressed as a percentage of 
the total payments for the years 2013-2017, divided by 
Member State. OLAF results are shown alongside those 
of national authorities.
(2)  Results by the Member States and OLAF may partially 
overlap. OLAF results are extracted from the OLAF Case 
Management System, and represent the total sum of financial 
recommendations issued at the end of the investigations. Data 
concerning Member States is extracted from the Irregularity 
Management System (IMS) for the two expenditure areas and 
from the OWNRES system for TOR. Data used in this report 
needs to be considered as provisional. Final data is published in 
the “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the Protection of the European Union’s 
financial interests — Fight against fraud” which will be 
published in September 2019.
Our analysis highlights once again the important 
contribution that OLAF investigations are making in 
helping the relevant authorities recover EU revenue 
and funds that have been defrauded or irregularly 
spent. In terms of Traditional Own Resources, OLAF 
financial recommendations would represent 2.67% 
of the gross TOR collected, compared to 2.05% for 
all Member States together. This means that, for this 
period, OLAF financial recommendations exceed the 
entire financial impact of the investigative and control 
activities of the Member States. The OLAF results are 
significantly influenced by the conclusion of a string of 
investigations linked to the undervaluation of imported 
goods. These results also highlight OLAF’s commitment 
to utilising resources effectively and concentrating on 
cases where its input would bring most added value. 
OLAF results are also significant in the shared 
management areas, where the financial impact of the 
activities of all Member States together accounts for 
2.01% of payments, while OLAF alone recommended 
the recovery of 0.45% of payments. In this area, 
OLAF financial recommendations would represent 
18%-22%3 of the entire impact of investigative and 
control activities. There are particular countries where 
the financial impact of OLAF cases is particularly 
significant and, at times, even higher than that of 
national investigations. 
(3)  The range has been calculated assuming, for the lower limit, 
that OLAF results are not included in those reported by the 
Member States, while for the highest limit, the assumption 
is the opposite - that OLAF results are fully included in those 
reported by the Member States.
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Figure 12:  Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the area of 
Traditional Own Resources for the period 2014-2018
Traditional Own Resources (TOR) 2014-2018




Financial impact as 







N % N %
Austria 320 2.69% 8 0.23%
Belgium 1 092 0.95% 28 0.58%
Bulgaria 94 0.78% 15 1.08%
Croatia 72 1.63% 5 0.12%
Cyprus 32 0.63% 10 0.45%
Czechia 420 2.25% 17 1.34%
Denmark 353 1.60% 15 0.49%
Estonia 40 1.59% 5 0.12%
Finland 176 1.24% 7 0.11%
France 1 733 2.45% 23 0.34%
Germany 9 279 2.17% 36 0.23%
Greece 224 6.84% 18 22.13%
Hungary 167 1.56% 12 0.14%
Ireland 166 1.25% 5 0.06%
Italy 668 1.05% 33 0.20%
Latvia 118 4.40% 9 1.40%
Lithuania 224 2.54% 13 0.94%
Luxembourg 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Malta 13 3.68% 3 1.24%
Netherlands 2 331 3.34% 45 1.80%
Poland 756 0.91% 21 0.45%
Portugal 172 3.23% 18 0.87%
Romania 282 2.78% 26 1.09%
Slovakia 85 0.78% 9 50.11%
Slovenia 57 0.76% 11 0.33%
Spain 1 614 2.22% 34 0.79%
Sweden 587 0.93% 14 0.29%
United Kingdom 4 624 2.18% 40 10.96%
Total 25 699 2.05% 480 2.67%
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Figure 13:  Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the areas of 
European Structural and Investment Funds and Agriculture for the period 2014-2018
Shared Management: Cohesion and Natural Resources 2014-2018












N % N %
Austria 370 0.37% 2 0.02%
Belgium 315 0.46% 1 0.02%
Bulgaria 1 072 1.92% 27 0.42%
Croatia 189 0.95% 2 0.34%
Cyprus 82 0.74% 0 0.00%
Czechia 2 665 2.86% 7 0.06%
Denmark 144 0.27%  0 0.00%
Estonia 412 1.58% 0 0.00%
Finland 155 0.12%  0 0.00%
France 1 291 0.30% 10 0.01%
Germany 1 567 0.31% 4 0.37%
Greece 2 206 2.50% 17 0.31%
Hungary 2 886 1.31% 52 3.84%
Ireland 1 120 1.88%  0 0.00%
Italy 4 117 1.33% 21 0.35%
Latvia 517 2.36% 1 0.01%
Lithuania 1 110 2.05% 3 0.11%
Luxembourg 2 0.02%  0 0.00%
Malta 91 2.53%  0 0.00%
Netherlands 777 0.79% 4 0.04%
Poland 5 103 1.89% 22 0.12%
Portugal 2 723 2.04% 10 0.42%
Romania 5 563 3.23% 66 0.40%
Slovakia 1 649 19.29% 14 2.29%
Slovenia 261 1.59% 1 0.14%
Spain 10 995 3.31% 7 0.43%
Sweden 175 0.20%  0 0.00%
United Kingdom 2 596 0.57% 6 0.05%
Total 50 153 2.01% 277 0.45%
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5.2. Judicial monitoring
Judicial monitoring allows OLAF to see the final 
outcome of its cases, be it indictments, dismissals or 
other judicial measures, if any. 
According to Article 11 of Regulation No. 883/20134, at 
the request of the Office, the national judicial authorities 
concerned must send OLAF information on the action 
taken on the basis of its judicial recommendations.   
Based on the monitoring carried out in 2018, OLAF 
noted that around 36% of the cases it submitted to 
national judicial authorities have led to indictments. 
While judicial authorities are independent and while 
the legal architecture may vary at Member State level, 
OLAF has worked on understanding the reasons why 
national judiciaries dismissed some of the cases OLAF 
had submitted. 
While it is not for OLAF to question the validity of 
national prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss individual 
cases on particular grounds, it appears that article  11 
paragraph 2 of Regulation 883/2013 is not a sufficient 
legal basis to allow all Member States’ judicial 
(4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 883/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Council 
Regulation 
authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. 
Therefore, in numerous Member States, after receiving 
the OLAF final report, prosecutors carry out all the 
investigation activities once again in order to acquire 
admissible evidence. 
Sometimes, despite considerable investigative efforts 
deployed by the Office, its limited investigation powers 
and practical possibilities do not allow to collect 
conclusive evidence of a criminal offence.
As regards internal investigations, whereas for OLAF 
any infringement committed by EU staff is regarded as 
a very serious matter, irrespective of the prejudice to 
the EU budget, the priorities of the national judiciaries 
may be different.
Finally, there are sometimes differences of 
interpretation of EU and national law between OLAF 
and national authorities. In 2016, OLAF started to 
address these differences, through bilateral meetings 
with the relevant judicial authorities. This work 
continues to date. OLAF liaises with Member States 
on an ongoing basis in order to improve follow-up at 
national level.
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Figure 14:  Actions taken by national judicial authorities (JA) following OLAF’s recommendations issued 
between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2018
Member state No decision 
taken by JA* 
so far
Decision taken by JA Indictment rate
Total Dismissed Indictment
Austria 2 4 3 1 25%
Belgium 11 20 11 9 45%
Bulgaria 9 13 12 1 8%
Croatia 3 2 1 1 50%
Cyprus 3 2 2 0 0%
Czechia 4 7 6 1 14%
Denmark 1 3 2 1 33%
Estonia 0 2 1 1 50%
Finland 1 3 3 0 0%
France 11 4 3 1 25%
Germany 14 19 15 4 21%
Greece 16 10 2 8 80%
Hungary 20 20 11 9 45%
Ireland 1 2 2 0 0%
Italy 21 23 12 11 48%
Latvia 1 4 3 1 25%
Lithuania 2 6 2 4 67%
Luxembourg 5 7 4 3 43%
Malta 1 5 0 5 100%
Netherlands 5 13 8 5 38%
Poland 14 9 2 7 78%
Portugal 6 8 5 3 38%
Romania 20 84 59 25 30%
Slovakia 5 12 9 3 25%
Slovenia 3 1 0 1 100%
Spain 10 17 11 6 35%
Sweden 0 3 2 1 33%
United Kingdom 19 16 12 4 25%
Grand Total 208 319 203 116 36%
* In the category of no decision taken, we include also those cases that are still in the so-called “reporting period”. When OLAF 
sends a judicial recommendation to a Member State, the competent authority has to report on the actions taken following the 
recommendation within 12 months.
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5.3. Disciplinary monitoring
EU INSTITUTIONS TAKE ACTION  
TO FOLLOW UP ON OLAF’S INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS
The disciplinary recommendations issued by OLAF 
concern serious misconduct of EU staff or members 
of the EU institutions and are directed to the authority 
having disciplinary powers in the institution concerned. 
When making such recommendations, OLAF does 
not specify the type of action that should be taken. 
The appointing authorities sometimes take several 
actions following a single recommendation from OLAF. 
At the same time, the appointing authority may join 
several recommendations resulting from different 
investigations and, subsequently, impose one single 
sanction. 
Figure 15:  Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF’s disciplinary recommendations 
issued between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2018
Recipient of recommendation Total No decision 
taken so far
Decision taken
No case is made Action taken
Agencies 9 0 4 5
Committee of the Regions 1 1 0 0
Council of the European Union 1 0 0 1
EULEX Kosovo 1 0 1 0
European Commission 18 6 5 7
European Court of Auditors 2 0 0 2
European Court of Justice 2 1 1 0
European Economic and Social 
Committee
1 0 1 0
European External Action Service 3 1 0 2
European Investment Bank 1 0 0 1
European Parliament 7 4 0 3
Total 46 13 12 21
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6. Policies to fight fraud
In addition to its investigative work, OLAF plays an 
active role in the development of the anti-fraud policies 
of the European Union. The Office is regularly at the 
forefront of drafting and negotiating legislative texts 
concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests 
against fraud and corruption. It is thanks to its solid 
investigative expertise that OLAF can support the EU 
institutions in furthering a sound legal framework to 
protect the EU budget and taxpayers’ money. 
6.1. Improving fraud prevention and 
detection at EU level:  
the new Commission  
Anti-Fraud Strategy of 2019
The Commission’s Corporate Governance Package5 of 
21 November 2018 highlighted the need to improve the 
EU institutions’ knowledge of the main causes of fraud, 
as well as of the newest trends in this domain. It called 
for strengthening the corporate oversight of the fight 
against fraud in the Commission services. 
From a longer-term perspective, the fight against fraud 
needs to meet emerging challenges under the coming 
multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021–2027. This 
will require a new, enhanced approach to preventing, 
detecting and investigating fraud at EU level.
This is why, throughout 2018, OLAF worked with 
Commission Directorates-General and executive 
agencies on a revision of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud 
Strategy. The new Strategy was adopted in April 2019.
The new Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS) is 
based on an evaluation of the prior Strategy in place 
since 2011, as well as on a fraud risk assessment that 
was carried out by OLAF with the active involvement of 
Commission departments and Executive agencies. Such 
departments and agencies are responsible for their own 
internal control systems and are thus in the frontline 
(5) Communication to the Commission on Streamlining and 
strengthening corporate governance within the European 
Commission (C(2018) 7704 final) and Communication to the 
Commission on Governance in the European Commission 
(C(2018) 7703 final).
of the fight against fraud. The evaluation highlighted 
in particular the need to adapt to an evolving situation 
(new funding schemes, new fraud trends, development 
of IT tools, etc.). The 2019 CAFS also takes into account 
recommendations made by the European Court of 
Auditors in its Special Report 01/2019 “Fighting fraud in 
EU spending: action needed” (published on 10 January 
2019)6.
The two priority axes of the 2019 CAFS aim at 
strengthening the Commission’s capabilities in the 
strategic analysis of fraud data and OLAF’s role in 
coordinating fraud risk management by Commission 
services and executive agencies.
Coherence between the anti-fraud strategies of 
Commission Directorates-General will be ensured in the 
future through mandatory quality control by OLAF. As a 
new task, OLAF will also monitor the implementation of 
anti-fraud strategies at service level.
Reliable, complete and accurate data and their analysis 
form the basis of well-grounded policy-making. OLAF 
already collects and analyses data on fraud and other 
irregularities, notably in the customs area and in the 
domain of shared management, where Member States 
spend EU funds according to EU rules. However, the 
quality of these data needs to improve further and 
the analysis of fraud risks based on these data should 
become more comprehensive, in order to contribute to a 
more efficient deployment of anti-fraud controls. 
Ultimately, this strengthened analysis aims to improve 
prevention, detection and investigation, for example 
through better data on fraud patterns and systemic 
vulnerabilities, which can be acted upon through 
developing risk indicators tailored to specific sectors 
or regions and widening knowledge about fraudulent 
activities in general.
All Commission services and Executive agencies will 
contribute to the implementation of the new CAFS 
2019, which will be coordinated by OLAF.
(6) https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=48858
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6.2. Revision of the  
OLAF Regulation  
(EU, Euratom No. 883/2013) 7
The Regulation concerning investigations conducted 
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (“the OLAF 
Regulation”)8 is the main legal instrument governing 
OLAF’s investigative activities. In May 2018, the 
Commission adopted a proposal to amend it. Against 
the backdrop of the creation of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the proposal seeks to 
ensure that OLAF is equipped to work closely with the 
EPPO to detect and investigate fraud across the EU and 
to ensure strong complementarity between criminal 
and administrative action at Union level. The proposed 
changes are also intended to clarify OLAF’s tools for the 
conduct of administrative investigations with a view to 
ensuring their effectiveness, responding to the findings 
of the evaluation of the OLAF Regulation, which was 
concluded in October 20179.
For the future OLAF-EPPO relationship, the proposal 
sets the framework for a close and complementary 
cooperation, so that all available means are used to 
protect the Union budget. While the EPPO will conduct 
criminal investigations, OLAF will continue conducting 
administrative investigations which – in the Member 
States participating in the EPPO – will have a particular 
emphasis on facilitating recovery and preventing 
further harm to EU finances through administrative 
measures. 
The proposal also contains a number of targeted 
changes to enhance the effectiveness of OLAF 
investigations. These are essential changes necessary 
to strengthen the framework for OLAF investigations, 
in order to maintain a strong and fully functioning OLAF 
that complements the EPPO’s criminal law approach 
with administrative investigations. The focus is on areas 
where, today, the lack of clarity of certain provisions 
in the current OLAF Regulation results in obstacles 
which hinder OLAF’s effective operations. This regards, 
(7) COM (2018) 338 final - 2018/0170/COD
(8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 883/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation 
(Euratom) No. 1074/1999, OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1–22.
(9) Commission Report on the Evaluation of the application of 
Regulation No. 883/2013, COM(2017)589 final.
notably on-the-spot-checks and inspections, access 
to bank account information, as well as VAT fraud 
and the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence. The 
amendments aim to clarify OLAF’s legal framework 
and would allow it to operate in an effective and more 
coherent manner in all its investigations.
To ensure both a seamless transition to the new 
institutional framework and an effective cooperation 
between OLAF and the EPPO, the amended regulation 
should be in force by the time the EPPO becomes 
operational10. The legislative negotiations on the 
proposal with the co-legislators started in 2018 with 
a detailed analysis of the European Commission’s 
proposal in the Council working party for combatting 
fraud.
6.3. The European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office
Over a year has passed since the publication of the 
Regulation on the creation of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)11. The establishment of a 
strong, efficient and independent EPPO represents a 
priority for the Commission and particularly for OLAF, 
as co-responsible Commission service. The creation of 
the EPPO marks a fundamental development in the fight 
against fraud affecting the European Union’s budget, 
and it constitutes a crucial step towards the creation of 
a common criminal justice area in the European Union.
With the establishment of the EPPO by the end of 2020 
drawing closer, many crucial developments have taken 
place in 2018: the interim Administrative Director was 
appointed, the vacancy notice for the selection of the 
European Chief Prosecutor was published in November 
2018 and the recruitment procedure is ongoing, as well 
as the selection process for the European prosecutors in 
the Member States. Additionally, the Netherlands and 
Malta have officially joined the EPPO under enhanced 
cooperation, which makes a total of 22 participating 
Member States.
(10)  This is currently envisaged for the end of 2020.
(11) Regulation (EU) 2017/1939
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6.4. Horizontal provisions on the 
Protection of the Financial 
Interests of the Union 
(PIF provisions) within all  
MFF Commission Proposals 
In 2018, in close cooperation with spending and central 
Commission services, OLAF introduced standard 
provisions on the protection of the financial interests of 
the European Union in all the Commission’s legislative 
proposals for the post-2020 spending programmes 
under direct, indirect and shared management. These 
provisions reflect requirements laid down in the 
Financial Regulation and recall, inter alia, that the 
financial interests of the Union are to be protected 
through proportionate measures, including the 
prevention, detection, correction and investigation 
of fraud and other irregularities. Any person or entity 
receiving Union funds is obliged to fully cooperate in 
the protection of the Union’s financial interests, to 
grant the necessary access rights to the Commission, 
OLAF, the EPPO and the European Court of Auditors 
and to ensure that any third parties involved in the 
implementation of Union funds grant equivalent rights.
6.5. A new anti-fraud financial 
programme
In May 2018, the Commission adopted a proposal 
for a Regulation establishing a new EU Anti-Fraud 
Programme, destined to be the successor of the 
Hercule III Programme for the period 2021-2027. 
The proposal for the EU Anti-Fraud Programme is an 
ambitious project, combining the long-standing Hercule 
programme that has supported the fight against fraud 
since 2004 with two other long-established activities 
in the anti-fraud area: the Anti-Fraud Information 
System (AFIS), that supports Member States customs 
authorities in their mutual administrative assistance to 
prevent and detect customs fraud, and the Irregularity 
Management System (IMS) that provides an IT platform 
for the Member States to report detected irregularities 
to the detriment of the EU budget.
In other words, the new EU Anti-Fraud Programme will 
include funding for an improved Hercule III programme, 
as well as for AFIS and IMS. The proposed combination 
will create flexibility from a budgetary and management 
point of view and improve operational synergies 
between the combined activities. It should allow the 
Programme to better adapt to new and unforeseen 
needs during the seven years of the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework.
6.6. Strengthening the EU’s policy  
on fighting illicit tobacco trade
OLAF not only works to fight illicit tobacco trade from 
an operational point of view, but contributes to the 
development of EU policies in this area. 
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On 23 March 2018, OLAF and the European Economic 
and Social Committee jointly organised a conference 
in Brussels on fighting illicit tobacco. The conference 
gathered 130 stakeholders from policy-makers to law 
enforcement and customs services, health NGOs, 
consumer organisations, academics and industry. It 
showed that the illicit tobacco trade is a major challenge 
to society in general, affecting the EU’s tax, health 
and security policies. A holistic approach is needed to 
effectively combat the illicit tobacco trade and this will 
arguably require measures targeting both the supply (e.g. 
by strengthening international customs cooperation) 
and demand side (e.g. by raising consumer awareness) of 
the illicit market. In this respect, the importance of the 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 
(FCTC Protocol) as a new key tool to fight the illicit 
tobacco trade at the global level was highlighted.
The first Meeting of the Parties to the FCTC Protocol 
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products was 
held in Geneva in October 2018. This was an historic 
event marking the entry into force of the Protocol as 
a dedicated global anti-smuggling treaty. The event is 
the culmination of years of EU engagement, with OLAF 
as lead service, beginning with the inception of the 
Protocol through its negotiation phase and ending with 
its entry into force on 25 September 2018.
The EU remains committed to the success of the 
FCTC Protocol and will actively contribute to the 
work leading up to the second Meeting of the Parties 
in 2020, focusing on securing the supply chain of 
tobacco products and international cooperation. The 
EU will continue to promote ratification of the Protocol, 
especially in relevant source and transit countries on 
major smuggling routes.
On 7 December 2018, the Commission also presented 
the Second Action Plan to fight the illicit tobacco 
trade. The Action Plan builds further on the Strategy 
presented in 201312 but also updates it in a number of 
aspects. Covering the period 2018-2022, the Second 
Action plan proposes:
  To fully exploit the potential of the new FCTC 
Protocol as a global instrument and forum to curb 
the illicit tobacco trade, by taking a leading role in its 
implementation, following the entry into force of the 
Protocol on 25 September 2018;
  To engage key source and transit countries via the 
various frameworks for cooperation available to the 
EU, so as to limit the supply actually arriving at our 
borders;
  To focus on some of the key input materials going 
into the illicit manufacture of tobacco products, 
ranging from raw tobacco and cigarette filters to 
manufacturing and packing equipment; and 
  To raise awareness among consumers of the dangers 
of buying illicit tobacco products and the direct links 
to organised crime, as a means to reduce demand.
(12) COM/2013/0324 final
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7. Relations with the Supervisory Committee 
The Supervisory Committee of OLAF is a body of five 
independent outside experts, established to reinforce 
and guarantee OLAF’s independence by regularly 
monitoring the implementation of OLAF’s investigative 
function. Its members are appointed by common 
agreement of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission.
The current Members are: Mr Jan Mulder (Chairman), 
Mr Petr Klement, Ms Grażyna Stronikowska, Ms Helena 
Fazenda and Mr Rafael Muñoz. In line with Regulation 
No.  883/2013, the Members are supported by a 
Secretariat provided by the European Commission.  
The Director-General of OLAF keeps the Supervisory 
Committee regularly informed about the activities of 
the Office, the implementation of OLAF’s investigative 
function and the follow-up to investigations. 
In 2018, in accordance with Regulation 883/2013, OLAF 
made available to the Committee 486 documents with 
information on investigations lasting more than 12 
months. OLAF also informed the Committee of judicial 
recommendations transmitted to the national judicial 
authorities, and of OLAF cases in which information 
was sent to national judicial authorities at the dismissal 
of the case. The Committee and its Secretariat had full 
access to 64 case files in OLAF’s case management 
system in 2018. 
On the basis of the information provided by OLAF, the 
Committee delivers Opinions to the Director-General 
of OLAF and reports to the EU institutions. In 2018, 
the Supervisory Committee delivered its Opinion 
1/2018, concerning the OLAF Preliminary Draft Budget 
for 2019, and provided comments to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the amendment of 
Regulation 883/2013. 
In its Opinions, the Supervisory Committee issues 
recommendations to the Director-General. OLAF 
reports annually to the Committee on the state of 
implementation of these recommendations. In its 2018 
reporting, OLAF assessed five recommendations out 
of ten as implemented, four as ongoing and one as not 
applicable.
Details of the Committee’s work can be found in 
its annual activity report. This report and OLAF’s 
responses, as well as other information, are publicly 
available on the OLAF website. 
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8. Data protection, legality checks  
and complaints
The protection of personal data has always been a 
high priority for OLAF. Since OLAF was set up as 
an independent investigative body, it has taken all 
necessary measures to ensure effective implementation 
of the requirements of the applicable legal framework, 
including recommendations of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The decisions and 
recommendations of the EDPS have a significant impact 
on how OLAF carries out its investigative activities, 
such as on-the-spot checks or the forensic examination 
of digital media. OLAF appoints its own data protection 
officer (DPO) who provides advice and assists OLAF in 
applying high data protection standards. 
In December 2018, the new Data Protection Regulation 
for EU institutions 2018/172513 entered into force. 
OLAF has committed to lead by example. OLAF 
(13) OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98
conducted awareness-raising activities internally and 
took measures to efficiently implement the new data 
protection rules. In this context, the Commission 
adopted a Decision laying down internal rules 
concerning the processing of personal data by OLAF14. 
This initiative ensures compliance with the fundamental 
right to protect personal data as set out in Article 8 of 
the Charter, while enabling the Office to secure the 
confidentiality of its investigations as well as to ensure 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of persons 
concerned, witnesses and informants. The Decision 
lays out the conditions under which OLAF informs 
data subjects of any activity involving processing 
(14)  Commission Decision (EU) 2018/1962 of 11 December 2018 
laying down internal rules concerning the processing of 
personal data by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in 
relation to the provision of information to data subjects and 
the restriction of certain of their rights in accordance with 
Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 315, 12.12.2018, p. 41
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of their personal data and handles their rights of 
access, rectification, erasure, restriction of processing 
and communication of a personal data breach. The 
involvement of OLAF’s DPO (or, where applicable, the 
Commission DPO or the agency DPO) throughout the 
whole procedure ensures an independent review of 
the applied restrictions. In addition, the codification 
of OLAF’s established practices and procedures in the 
mentioned Decision ensures a high degree of legal 
certainty to all data subjects, thus also complying with 
the “quality of law” requirements developed by case 
law.
In 2018, OLAF maintained its commitment to ensure 
the timely provision of relevant information to data 
subjects. OLAF received and handled 11 requests for 
access to personal data as well as two requests for 
erasure. They were all handled in a timely manner. There 
were no new complaints received from the EDPS during 
2018. An allegation reported of an alleged breach was 
not substantiated.
OLAF RECEIVES VERY LOW NUMBER  
OF COMPLAINTS ON ITS INVESTIGATIVE 
ACTIVITY
COMPLAINTS TO OLAF
Persons affected by an OLAF investigation may address 
a complaint directly to the Director-General of OLAF. 
This is without prejudice to the citizens’ right to lodge 
a complaint with the European Ombudsman or to raise 
issues related to OLAF investigations before the EU or 
national courts. 
In 2018, the Director-General received five complaints 
from persons involved in different OLAF investigations 
about issues relating to the handling of their procedural 
guarantees. They have been followed up by the 
competent services in the Office.
Officials and other EU staff may also complain to OLAF 
under Article 90a of the Staff Regulations against any 
act adversely affecting them in connection with OLAF 
investigations. In 2018, OLAF provided a substantiated 
reply to Article 90a complaint received at the end of 
2017.
EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN
In 2018, the European Ombudsman opened 16 
new inquiries concerning OLAF. Two of the new 
inquiries concerned procedural guarantees in OLAF 
investigations.  One of them was closed in the course 
of the year without a finding of maladministration. In 
that same case, the Ombudsman also found that OLAF 
could have better explained why it had taken certain 
investigative steps rather than others and therefore 
made two suggestions for improvement to OLAF in 
that regard.
Seven of the new inquiries concerned the lack of reply 
by OLAF to citizens’ requests.  As OLAF eventually 
replied to these requests, the Ombudsman closed six 
of these inquiries in the course of the year, with the 
conclusion that OLAF has settled the matter.
Five other new inquiries opened in 2018 concerned 
requests for public access to documents based on 
Regulation No.  1049/200115. The Ombudsman closed 
four of these inquiries in the course of the year, with the 
conclusion that OLAF did not act with maladministration 
when it refused to grant public access to the requested 
documents. In one of these cases, the Ombudsman also 
made two suggestions for improvement to OLAF about 
how to deal with such requests. 
Two other inquiries opened in 2018 concerned the 
access to an investigation file by the person concerned, 
and OLAF’s decision not to open an investigation 
respectively. The Ombudsman completed these 
inquiries with the conclusion that OLAF’s refusal to 
give individual access to its investigation file to a 
person concerned and OLAF’s decision not to open the 
investigation in question were justified.
In 2018, the Ombudsman also closed four inquiries 
opened in previous years. 
SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW  
BY THE EUROPEAN COURTS
Issues related to OLAF investigations were also 
raised before the European Courts in a very limited 
number of cases. Usually, this occurs in the context of 
litigation against measures taken by the Commission 
or other institutions, bodies or agencies based on 
(15) OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48
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OLAF recommendations, such as financial recovery or 
disciplinary procedures. 
In the case of Sigma Orionis v Commission16, the Court 
clarified which law applies during on-the-spot checks 
and inspections by OLAF. 
The Court ruled that, in the absence of opposition by the 
economic operator, on-the-spot checks and inspections 
are conducted by OLAF on the basis of Regulation No. 
883/2013 and Regulation No. 2185/199617, as well as 
based on written authorisation of the Director-General 
of OLAF. 
Union law supersedes national law when a matter is 
regulated by Regulations No. 883/2013 or No. 2185/1996. 
(16)  Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 in case T-48/16, 
Sigma Orionis SA v European Commission.
(17) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 
1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried 
out by the Commission in order to protect the European 
Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other 
irregularities
Moreover, the Court found that the provisions in 
Regulation No. 2185/1996 concerning the possible 
opposition of the economic operator concerned to a 
check do not include the existence of a “right to oppose” 
but simply provide that the check may be imposed 
on the economic operator through the assistance of 
national authorities and on the basis of national law.
With regard to procedural guarantees, the Court 
recalled that OLAF must respect fundamental rights as 
laid down in Union law, in particular in the Charter.
The important clarification by the Court of law that 
applies during on-the-spot checks helps increase the 
efficiency of OLAF investigations.
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg
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9. Staff and Budget 
INVESTING IN STAFF
In the context of the general reductions in staff and 
budget in the EU public service, the number of OLAF 
staff members continued to decrease in 2018. At the 
end of 2018, the total number of staff members and 
available vacancies at OLAF stood at 389, a 4% decrease 
compared to 2017. Despite this, OLAF did its utmost 
to maintain the staff resources allocated to the fight 
against fraud and to its anti-fraud policy work, with 
staff cuts mainly impacting overhead functions such as 
HR, finance and ICT infrastructure management.
OLAF staff members have had to adapt to a structural 
increase in workload, while maintaining the quality 
and efficiency of investigations. In a context of limited 
resources, OLAF counts on the wide range of skills and 
diverse professional background of its staff. Dealing 
efficiently with a high number of investigations in 
various fields and countries requires a high level of 
expertise, knowledge of a broad range of languages, as 
well as commitment to defending taxpayers’ interests. 
Two specialist competitions in the investigation field 
were finalised in 2017, providing OLAF with a list of 
45 laureates possessing the relevant professional 
experience and qualifications. In 2018, OLAF almost 
doubled the number of people it recruited, going from 
23 the previous year to 42.
OLAF continuously invests in career development. 
OLAF staff  have the opportunity to participate in 
European Commission or external training, coaching 
sessions or lunchtime debates and workshops, which 
further their professional and personal development. 
OLAF is also committed to investing in the training of 
its managers, to ensure excellent leadership.
Figure 17: Number and breakdown of OLAF staff from 2011 to 2018
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Establishment posts occupied 351 347 350 362 356 336 318 318
Establishment posts vacant 33 35 34 18 11 24 32 27
External staff 53 53 56 59 55 55 55 44
Total 437 435 440 439 422 415 405 389
OLAF Directors and Director-General
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External agents (contract staff, seconded national experts and interims) 2.5
Missions 1.4
Anti-fraud Measures 1.9
Training, meetings and Committees 0.5
Total 59.1
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10.  Statistical annex: additional data on OLAF 
investigative activity
This annex presents additional detailed data relating to OLAF’s investigative activity in 2018, as a complement to the 
key indicators already mentioned in chapters 2 and 5.
Figure 20: OLAF’s investigative performance
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Incoming information 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136 1295 1211
Investigations opened 152 146 431 253 234 219 219 215 219
Investigations concluded 136 154 266 293 250 304 272 197 167
Recommendations issued 172 175 199 353 397 364 346 309 256
Figure 21: Selections completed and their duration*
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Selections completed 886 926 1770 1247 1353 1442 1157 1111 1259
Average duration (in months) 
of selection phase
6.3 6.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.6
* Since a new case management system was introduced at the end of 2016, the processing of new incoming information required more 
time. This explains why the average duration of selections has increased to 2.6 months in 2018. It is expected that the average duration 
of selections will decrease.
Figure 22: Average duration of closed and ongoing investigations (in months)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Average duration of investigation 20.8 22.4 17.3 17.5 18.1 18.7 17.2 15.8 16.4
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
6.4 6.9 6.3 4.3 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.2
Total average duration of cases 27.2 29.3 23.6 21.8 21.0 21.0 18.9 17.6 18.6
Figure 23: Average duration of closed investigations only (in months)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Average duration of investigation 22.9 27.0 22.5 22.3 23.3 25.1 23.2 21.9 23.1
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
5.6 6.1 7.5 5.9 3.6 2.8 1.8 1.7 1.9
Total average duration of cases 28.5 33.1 30.0 28.2 26.9 27.9 25.0 23.6 25.0
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Figure 24: Percentage of ongoing investigations lasting more than 20 months
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage of ongoing investigations 
lasting more than 20 months
41% 38% 22% 30% 30% 22% 20% 22% 22%
Figure 25: Recommendations issued
Type of recommendation 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Financial 62 63 116 233 253 220 209 195 168
Judicial 67 73 54 85 101 98 87 80 48
Disciplinary 10 16 25 24 15 16 18 10 18
Administrative 33 23 4 11 28 30 32 24 22
Total 172 175 199 353 397 364 346 309 256
Figure 26: Incoming information by source
Source 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
PRIVATE 594 767 889 889 959 933 756 889 807
PUBLIC 381 274 375 405 458 439 380 404 404
Total 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136 1293 1211
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Figure 27:  Incoming information from Member States in 2018
Member State Public source Private source Total
Austria 1 3 4
Belgium 6 12 18
Bulgaria 3 45 48
Croatia 0 26 26
Cyprus 0 1 1
Czechia 0 21 21
Denmark 0 4 4
Estonia 0 0 0
Finland 1 2 3
France 2 14 16
Germany 1 28 29
Greece 3 26 29
Hungary 1 32 33
Ireland 0 6 6
Italy 0 23 23
Latvia 2 1 3
Lithuania 3 3 6
Luxembourg 0 2 2
Malta 0 3 3
Netherlands 2 3 5
Poland 0 35 35
Portugal 1 12 13
Romania 2 56 58
Slovakia 3 24 27
Slovenia 1 3 4
Spain 5 27 32
Sweden 0 3 3
United Kingdom 0 6 6
Total 37 421 458
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